Income variability and selection of the pension system


GÖKTUNA B. Ö.

MANAGERIAL AND DECISION ECONOMICS, cilt.40, ss.267-276, 2019 (SSCI İndekslerine Giren Dergi) identifier identifier

  • Cilt numarası: 40 Konu: 3
  • Basım Tarihi: 2019
  • Doi Numarası: 10.1002/mde.3000
  • Dergi Adı: MANAGERIAL AND DECISION ECONOMICS
  • Sayfa Sayıları: ss.267-276

Özet

This paper provides a simple two-period, game theoretic set-up with heterogeneous agents to analyse individual selection of a pension scheme by different categories of agents. Agents have been differentiated according to their income variability. We describe Bayesian equilibria and provide examples to illustrate. The design of a pension scheme requires the consent of all the population. and we have shown that differences of volatility of income contribute to the divergence regarding the decision of a pension investment alternative. We also provide support for the subsistence of unfunded scheme in economies with demographic aging and with promising returns in funded alternatives.