It is possible to attribute the formation of philosophical terminology to two main sources: The first is to give more refined meanings
to the everyday words of the language that drives philosophical thought. Thus, a word in everyday language acquires a specific
conceptual meaning and becomes a philosophical term. The second is to create new concepts and invent new terms to name them.
In this article, we analyse the concept created by the philosopher John R. Searle and expressed in his native language by the term
‘deontic power’. Searle explains that the concepts of “obligation”, “duty”, “authorisation”, “entitlement” and “right” all belong to the
category he refers to by the term ‘deontic powers’. Searle uses the term ‘deontic powers’ to encompass both positive deontic powers
(when we have a right) and negative deontic powers (when we have an obligation). He also distinguishes between ‘conditional
deontic powers’ and ‘disjunctive deontic powers’. In his original ontology, Searle distinguishes institutional phenomena, which
are human products, from physical phenomena, and proves that institutional phenomena such as money, marriage, legislation,
inheritance, diploma, title-deed, cheque, etc. are language-dependent phenomena. Institutional phenomena require language in
a broad sense, that is, a kind of symbolisation. According to Searle, symbolisation is the carrier of deontic powers. Animals cannot
recognise deontic powers because they lack linguistic means of representation. Searle explains that most rights exist within
institutions: For example, the rights of property owners and of university students come into existence under property law and
university regulations. For obligations, rights, duties, etc. to exist, they must be represented in a linguistic or symbolic form. Searle
thus argues that language is the constitutive element of deontic powers.